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Local Government - February 2009

 

Human rights – Article 3 positive obligations
In Re E (a child)  House of Lords -12 November 2008


Background
The claimant and her daughter were catholics living in Belfast.  In 2001, as reported widely at the time, they were subjected to violent and unlawful protestant protest on their daily walk to and from school. The decisions of the police as to the levels of protection required and the approach to the conduct of the mass demonstrations were attacked in these proceedings. Despite the events in question having long since passed before the proceedings were commenced, the courts permitted the issues raised to be argued because of their wider public importance. The claimant’s challenge to the police actions was on the basis that they had failed to take sufficient steps to discharge the positive obligation arising under the article 3 right not to be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment. The application for judicial review failed before Kerr J in the High Court, and the appeal failed before the Court of Appeal. The matter then came before the House of Lords.

House of Lords
Lord Carswell delivered the leading Judgment with which the remaining Law Lords agreed, Baroness Hale of Richmond adding some comments of her own. The appeal was dismissed. The court rejected the contention that the positive obligation arising under article 3 could be as absolute as the negative obligation – “to hold otherwise would be to place an intolerable burden on the state” quoting from his earlier observations in Re Officer L [2007] House of Lords.  It was confirmed that “the applicant has to show that the authorities failed to do all that was reasonably to be expected of them to avoid [article 3 being infringed]. The standard accordingly is based on reasonableness, which brings in consideration of the circumstances of the case, the ease or difficulty of taking precautions and the resources available”.  Whilst noting that a Human Rights Act compliant judicial review demanded “somewhat greater  intensity” under the proportionality approach than before, that did not avoid “according appropriate weight to the judgment of a person with responsibility for a given subject matter and access to special sources of knowledge and advice” – see Lord Bingham in Huang v. Home Department (2007) House of Lords.  As Lord Carswell put it – “the police… were uniquely placed through their experience and intelligence to make a judgment on the wisest course to take in all the circumstances. They had long and hard experience of the problems encountered in dealing with riotous situations in urban areas in Northern Ireland. The difficulty of catching and arresting malefactors who had means of retreat available through paths and gardens are self evident.  The police had available to them sources of information about what was happening in the community and what was likely to happen if they took certain courses of action, which they were experienced in assessing.”  The judge went on to conclude that “the evidence supports the overall wisdom of the course which they adopted. The assertions made by [the claimant] that they might possibly have adopted more robust action are in my view quite insufficient to establish that the course adopted was misguided, let alone unreasonable”.  That approach was echoed by Baroness Hale of Richmond – “…I don’t not think that it has been demonstrated that, had the police behaved at the outset in the way in which it is now said they should have behaved, the children’s experience would have been any better. Indeed, it could have been a great deal worse… Hindsight is a wonderful thing and no doubt the police have learned lessons from this whole experience. In a highly charged community dispute such as this, it is all too easy to find fault with what the authorities have done, when the real responsibility lies elsewhere”.

Comment
This is another interesting case reinforcing the nature of the positive obligation on the state to protect citizens from infringements of their article 3 rights. Readers may recall the European Court of Human Rights decision in Hadiye Dur v. Turkey. The positive obligation effectively mirrors the nature of the obligation under article 2. It is clear that, although the courts will scrutinise executive action with a greater intensity than before the coming into force of the Human Rights Act, they will be slow to second guess operational decisions made by those in a unique position to judge all potential ramifications.

Finally, there was an interesting comment from Lord Hoffman on the role of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) who appeared as first intervenor. Despite acknowledging the general assistance of intervenors on questions of general public  importance, in this case the NIHRC was criticised for simply repeating “in rather more emphatic terms” points already made adequately by the claimant’s legal team. Lord Hoffman expressed the hope that “intervenors will avoid unnecessarily taking up the time of the House in this way”.

Nick Peel
Weightmans LLP