On 29 October 2025 the High Court handed down judgment in Khamba v Harrow Council [2025] EWHC 2803. The judgment extends the principles enunciated in Poole v GN [2019] UKSC 25 and HXA v Surrey County Council [2023] UKSC 52 beyond children’s services and into the mental health sphere – and potentially beyond.
Weightmans represented the successful Defendant, Harrow Council, and instructed counsel James Weston of 7BR
Foster J, at first instance on strike out, ruled that Approved Mental Health Professionals (for whom local authorities are generally responsible) do not owe a common law duty of care when undertaking assessments for detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 (the MHA 1983) for two reasons: (i) a duty of care would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme under the MHA 1983 per E v East Berkshire; (ii) there is no assumption of responsibility when undertaking a statutory assessment. The court did not accept that the assessed person was a client or patient of the AMHP, despite AMHPs commonly being mental health nurses or mental health social workers and performing clinical roles (see paragraphs 107-148 of the judgment).
There is no previous authority on the point. The court reached its conclusions and was clear this was not an emerging area of law that required a trial on the basis of the principles established in Poole, HXA and other recent Supreme Court authorities.
Facts
The case was brought by three claimants, one of whom, claimant three , attacked his mother (claimant one), leaving her blind. Claimant two came upon the attack and was injured. The AMHP met claimant three for an assessment prior to the attack and determined, with the attending s.12 doctors, that claimant three did not require detention. Harrow was the local authority with statutory responsibility for organising AMHP services and was sued as regards the assessment.
Court’s conclusions
The claimants failed to seek permission to sue Harrow under s.139(2) of the MHA 1983. The entirety of the claims for all three claimants were therefore struck out (see paragraphs 76 to 106 of the judgment). This was despite the claimants’ counsel’s attempt to differentiate the claim from the statutory wording.
However, the court went on to find that the common law claims would have been struck out in any event.
Most of the Human Rights Act (the HRA) claims were also, the judge found, amenable to strike out - Articles 2, 3, 5 and 8 - for a range of reasons (see paragraphs 149 to 159).
No operational duty was owed to claimant two as the local authority did not know that she lived with claimant one or claimant three and she had not been named in the records. Her Article 8 HRA claim was disposed of for the same reasons as Article 3 - the local authority simply did not know, nor ought it to have known, of the risk, whether of inhuman or degrading treatment or to her physical and moral integrity.
All of claimant three’s HRA claim was also struck out. As the person committing the attack, he could not be said to have suffered ill-treatment whether under Articles 3 or 8.
Claimant three also sought to argue that his HRA claim could survive via claimant one as he was an indirect victim, even if he had not suffered any direct breach of his own rights. Foster J ruled that if the person whose rights were infringed can bring a claim, then there is no place for a secondary or other victim claim under the HRA.
Implications
The case brings significant extra protection to AMHPs: (i) permission needed to bring a claim; (ii) no common law duty of care owed.
It likely extends the Poole/HXA principles, in effect, to any public officer carrying out a statutory assessment for the benefit of a public body. They do not owe a common law duty of care and the principles in Poole are not reserved for children’s social service functions. A robust approach can be considered when defending such claims, meaning strike out considerations can be made earlier in a case to potentially prune the case, narrowing the issues and/or obtaining sizeable costs orders.
The judgment is also helpful in demonstrating how Article 3 and Article 8 claims will in practice often rise and fall together.
The judgment also confirmed that there is no place for secondary victim claims under the HRA 1998. The person who suffered the infringement needs to bring the claim unless they are deceased or unable to bring a claim themselves for some other reason.
This insight is co-authored by James Weston.
